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1Introduction
We discuss open problems concerning inverses of theorems appearing in ec0-
nomics and game theory. We often finds the following Berge maximum the-
orem under convexity as amathematical tools for optimal control problems
in economics and game theory:
Theorem 1[Berge] Let $X$ be asubset of $l$ -dimensional Euclidean space
$R^{l}$ and let $Y$ be asubset of $m$-dimensional Euclidean space $R^{m}$ . Let $u$ :
$X\cross Yarrow R$ be continuous and quasi-concave in its second variable, let
$S:Xarrow Y$ be continuous and nonempty compact and convex-valued. Then,
the correspondence $K$ : $Xarrow Y$ defined by
$K(x)= \{y \in S(x) : u(x, y) =\max_{z\in S(x)}u(x, z)\}$ , $x\in X$ (1)
is upper semicontinuous and compact and convex-valued.
It is known that inverses of Theorem 1hold (cf. [3], [5]) and we shall treat
arelated open inverse problem in Section 2.
Let $(\Omega, \ovalbox{\tt\small REJECT}, \mu)$ be afinite measure space, $u:\Omega\cross R_{+}^{l}arrow R_{+}$ a function with
appropriate properties and $e\in L_{1}(\Omega, R_{+}^{l})$ . Then, for each $S\in\ovalbox{\tt\small REJECT}$ , define
$v(S) \equiv\sup\{\int_{S}u(\omega, x(\omega))d\mu(w)$ : $x\in L_{1}(S, R_{+}^{l})$ , $\int_{S}xd\mu=\int_{S}ed\mu\}$ . (2)
The map $v$ on $\ovalbox{\tt\small REJECT}$ is called amarket game. It is known that amarket game
is totally balanced and inner continuous at any $S\in\tilde{}^{\mathcal{L}^{\mathrm{j}}}$ . (cf. [4]) We shall




In [3], the following inverse problem of Theorem 1is considered:
Let $X$ be asubset of $R^{l}$ and let $Y$ be aconvex subset $R^{m}$ . Let
$K$ : $Xarrow Y$ be anonempty compact convex-valued upper semi-
continuous correspondence and let $S$ : $Xarrow Y$ be acompact
convex-valued continuous correspondence such that $K(x)\subset S(x)$
for $x\in X$ . Then does there exist acontinuous function $u$ :
$X\cross Yarrow R$ such that
(i) $K(x)= \{y \in S(x) : u(x, y)=\max_{z\in S(x)}u(x, z)\}$ for $x\in X$ ;
(ii) $u(x, y)$ is quasi-concave in $y$ for $x\in X$?
and is obtained the following result:
Theorem 2Let $X$ be asubset of $R^{l}$ . Let $K$ : $Xarrow R^{m}$ be anonempty
compact convex-valued upper semicontinuous correspondence. Then there
exists acontinuous function $v$ : $X\cross R^{m}arrow[0,1]$ such that
(i) $K(x)= \{y \in R^{m} : v(x, y)=\max_{z\in R^{m}}v(x, z)\}$ for any $x\in X$ ;
(ii) $v(x, y)$ is quasi-concave in $y$ for any $x\in X$ .
It is tried to generalize Theorem 2to infinite dimensional case and aresult
is obtained in [5].
For atopological space $X$ and asubset $Y$ of atopological vector space,
acorrespondence $K$ : $Xarrow Y$ is said to be $\sigma$-selectionable if there exists a
sequence $\{K_{n}\}$ of continuous correspondences $K_{n}$ : $Xarrow Y$ with compact
convex values such that
(a) $K_{n+1}(x)\subset K_{n}(x)$ for any $x\in X$ and any $n\in N$;and
(b) $K(x)= \bigcap_{n}K_{n}(x)$ for any $x\in X$ .
It is known that an upper semicontinuous correspondence $K$ : $Xarrow$
$R^{m}$ , $X\subset R^{l}$ , with compact convex values is a-selectionable and hence the
following theorem obtained in [5] is ageneralization of Theorem 2.
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Theorem 3Let X be atopological space, and Y ametric t.v.s. whose balls
are convex, and K $\ovalbox{\tt\small REJECT}$ X $\ovalbox{\tt\small REJECT}$ Y aa-selectionable map. Then there exists a
continuous function u $\ovalbox{\tt\small REJECT}$ Xx $Y+$ [0,1] such that
(i) $K(x)= \{y \in Y : u(x, y) =\max_{z\in Y}f(x, z)\}$ for any $x\in X$ ;and
(ii) $u(x, y)$ is quasi-concave in $y$ for any $x\in X$ .
It is not known that the assumption of a-selectionability of the correspon-
dence $K$ can be removed or not even in the case that $X$ and $Y$ are subsets
of Banach spaces. Thus we have aconjecture:
Conjecture 1Let $X$ be asubset of aBanach space, $Y$ aBanach space and
$K$ : $Xarrow Y$ acompact convex-valued upper semicontinuous correspondence.
Then there exists acontinuous function $u:X\cross Y$ $arrow[0,1]$ such that
(i) $K(x)= \{y\in Y:u(x, y) =\max_{z\in Y}f(x, z)\}$ for any $x\in X$ ;and
(ii) $u(x, y)$ is quasi-concave in $y$ for any $x\in X$ .
3Market games
Let $(\Omega, \ovalbox{\tt\small REJECT}, \mu)$ be afinite measure space. Agame $v$ is anonnegative real
valued function, defined on the a-field $\ovalbox{\tt\small REJECT}$ , which maps the empty set to zero.
An outcome of agame $v$ is afinitely additive real valued function $\alpha$ on $\ovalbox{\tt\small REJECT}$
scuh that $\alpha(\Omega)=v(\Omega)$ . For an outcome $\alpha$ of $v$ , an integrable function $f$
satisfying $\int_{S}fd\mu=\alpha(S)$ for all $S\in\ovalbox{\tt\small REJECT}$ is said to be an outcome density of
$\alpha$ with respect to $\mu$ . An outcome indicates outcomes to each coalitions while
an outcome density designates outcomes to every players. The core of $v$ is
the set of outcomes $\alpha$ satisfying $\alpha(S)\geq v(S)$ for all $S\in\ovalbox{\tt\small REJECT}$ .
To every game $v$ we associate an extended real number $|v|$ defined by
$|v|= \sup\{\sum_{i=1}^{n}\lambda_{i}v(S_{i})$ : $\sum_{i=1}^{n}\lambda_{i}\chi_{S_{i}}\leq\chi_{\Omega}\}$ , (3)
where $n=1,2$ , $\ldots$ , $S_{i}\in\ovalbox{\tt\small REJECT}$ , $\lambda_{i}$ is areal number. The notation $\chi_{A}$ denotes
the characteristic function of asubset $A$ of $\Omega$ . For agame $v$ with $|v|<\infty$ ,
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we define two games $\overline{v}$ and $\hat{v}$ by
$\overline{v}(S)=\sup\{\sum_{i=1}^{n}\lambda_{i}v(S_{i})$ : $\sum_{i=1}^{n}\lambda_{i}\chi_{S:}\leq\chi s\}$ , $S\in\ovalbox{\tt\small REJECT}$ , (4)
$\mathrm{v}(\mathrm{S})=\min$ { $\alpha(S)$ : $\alpha$ is additive, $\alpha\geq v$ , $\alpha(\Omega)=|v|$ }, $S\in\ovalbox{\tt\small REJECT}$ , ’(5)
following [6]. Agame $v$ is said to be balanced if $v(\Omega)=|v|$ , totally balanced
if $v=\overline{v}$ and exact if $v=\hat{v}$ , respectively. It is proved in [6] that the core of
agame is nonempty if and only if it is balanced, every exact game is totally
balanced, and every totally balanced game is balanced.
Agame $v$ is said to be monotone if $S\subset T$ implies $v(S)\leq v(T)$ for any
$S$ and $T$ in $\ovalbox{\tt\small REJECT}$ . Agame $v$ is said to be inner continuous at $S$ in $\ovalbox{\tt\small REJECT}$ if it
follows that $\lim_{narrow\infty}v(S_{n})=v(S)$ for any nondecreasing sequence $\{S_{n}\}$ of
measurable sets such that $\bigcup_{n=1}^{\infty}S_{n}=S$ . Similarly, agame $v$ is said to be
outer continuous at $S$ in $\ovalbox{\tt\small REJECT}$ if it follows that $\lim_{narrow\infty}v(S_{n})=v(S)$ for any
nonincreasing sequence $\{S_{n}\}$ of measurable sets such that $\bigcap_{n=1}^{\infty}S_{n}=S$ . A
game $v$ is continuous at $S$ in $\ovalbox{\tt\small REJECT}$ if it is both inner and outer continuous at
$S$ .
We denote utilities of players by aCarath\’eodory type function $u$ de-
fined on $\Omega\cross R_{+}^{l}$ to $R_{+}$ , where $R_{+}^{l}$ denotes the nonnegative orthant of the
$l$-dimensional Euclidean space $R^{l}$ , and $R_{+}$ is the set of nonnegative real num-
bers. The nonnegative number $u(\omega, x)$ designates the density of the utility of
aplayer $\omega$ getting goods $x$ . We always use the ordinary coordinatewise order
when having concern with an order in $R_{+}^{l}$ . We suppose that the function
$u:\Omega\cross R_{+}^{l}arrow R_{+}$ satisfies the conditions:
1. The function $\omega$ }$arrow u(\omega, x)$ is measurable for all $x\in R_{+}^{l}$ ;
2. The function $x-*u(\omega, x)$ is continuous, concave, nondecreasing, and
$u(\omega, 0)=0$ , $\mathrm{f}$$\dot{\mathrm{o}}\mathrm{r}$ almost all $\omega$ in $\Omega$ ;
3. $\sigma\equiv\sup\{u(\omega, x) : (\omega, x)\in\Omega\cross B_{+}\}<\infty$ , where $B_{+}=\{x\in R_{+}^{l}$ :
$||x||\leq 1\}$ , and $||x||$ denotes the Euclidean norm of $x\in R_{+}^{l}$ .
For any set $S$ in $\ovalbox{\tt\small REJECT}$ , the set of integrable functions on $S$ to $R_{+}^{l}$ is denoted
by $L_{1}(S, R_{+}^{l})$ . We take an element $e$ of $L_{1}(\Omega, R_{+}^{l})$ as the density of initial
endowments for the players. For any $S$ in $\ovalbox{\tt\small REJECT}$ , define
$v(S) \equiv\sup\{\int_{S}u(\omega, x(\omega))d\mu(w)$ : $x\in L_{1}(S, R_{+}^{l})$ , $\int_{S}xd\mu=\int_{S}ed\mu\}$ . (6)
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The set function v defined above is called amarket game derived from the
market (q,$\ovalbox{\tt\small REJECT} \mathrm{y},$p, u, e).
The following theorem is proved in $[4]\ovalbox{\tt\small REJECT}$
Theorem 4The market game defined above is totally balanced and inner
continuous at every $S\in\ovalbox{\tt\small REJECT}$ .
Every exact game which is continuous at $\Omega$ , equivalently inner continuous
at $\Omega$ , is continuous at every $S$ in $\ovalbox{\tt\small REJECT}$ according to [6], but it is known that
amarket game is not necessarily continuous at every $S\in\ovalbox{\tt\small REJECT}$ . Thus we are
interested in the following conjecture as an inverse problem of Theorem 4to
understand the difference between totally balanced games and exact games.
Conjecture 2Atotally balanced game that is inner continuous at any $S$
in $\ovalbox{\tt\small REJECT}$ is amarket game, that is, agame derived from amarket.
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